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(More customer reviews)I have read LTC Wetterhahn's book and find that, while it makes interesting reading, it is factually lacking in numerous areas.
As a crewmember on the mission, I find many of the details of LTC Wetterhahn's book to be inaccurate, and thus he is led to some erroneous conclusions. As a low-ranking aircrew member (I had recently been promoted to first lieutenant at the time, flying as copilot aboard one of the HH-53 Jolly Green rescue helicopters), I was obviously not privy to many of the "behind the scenes" decisions which were unfolding during the incident. However, the aircraft I was on was involved in the battle from the initial insertion to the final pullout, logging 16 hours of flight time during the mission. Based on that, I feel relatively well qualified to comment on the tactical side of the operation.
As an example, on page 102, LTC Wetterhahn states "A talented A-7 strafer can routinely get off a very tight quarter-second burst, sending twenty or so rounds within a two-square-yard area." As a former project engineer at the Air Force Armament Laboratory, Guns and Rockets Branch, Eglin AFB, FL, I can tell you that, even if all weapons mounting and aiming tolerances were to be magically reduced to zero on the A-7s gun, the manufacturing tolerances of propellant load and projectile weight alone would still put the ballistic performance of the 20-mm gatling cannon on the A-7 outside of the range quoted in the book. Add back in the mounting, boresight and aiming system tolerances, and this statement is ludicrous. If the A-7 gunnery system was so accurate, why did it take multiple passes for the A-7s to neutralize the sunken gunboat off the north end of the island, as stated on p. 226? The fact is that the gunnery skills of the fighters, particularly the F-4s, was nowhere near what LTC Wetterhahn claims.
As to his major conclusions, on page 311, he writes: "Off the shores of Cambodia, the strategic imperatives of showing a "clear, clear" American victory resulted in the conscious abandonment of three Marines."
I, and all of the crewmember with which I have spoken since this book was released, take serious exception with this statement. There was no conscious decision to abandon anyone on the island. LTC Wetterhahn himself describes how TSgt Wayne Fisk stepped off the last departing helicopter, not once but twice, in an attempt to make sure we had everyone. TSgt Fisk did this at great risk to his own life. All of the crews still flying at the end of the day asked the command section numerous times to verify that all ground personnel were accounted for, and we were given an affirmative answer. To the best of our knowledge, we had all of the personnel on board with the departure of the last helicopter. All of the crewmembers who took part in this operation felt a great loss upon learning that some Marines were not recovered from the island, and we all salute the memories of the valiant servicemen who gave their lives in service to their country. However, as far as any "conscious abandonment" is concerned, I seriously disagree with LTC Wetterhahn's assessment on this point.
I further take exception to his conclusion, on page 259, that the seizure of the ship was the result of a decision by a local official rather than of the central government. I, for one, find it much more likely that the new government in Phnom Penh did, in fact, order the seizure of an American vessel as a way to show the world that it was in charge of the country which it had just taken over. With the example of the Pueblo to go on, and the fact that the US had just three weeks before been ejected from Vietnam, the Pol Pot government saw the situation as a prime opportunity to assert its authority and gain (at least, in its view) credibility with the world community by "tweaking the tiger's tail." They did not figure that President Ford would respond with a military action, and when it turned to mud around them, the high officials searched for a scapegoat. For LTC Wetterhahn to accept the word of an official of a government which went on to murder one-third of its own population is, in my opinion, excessively na?ve. Such naivete casts doubts on the credibility of other statements credited to Khmer officials.
I agree with his assessment on one point, however, and that is that attempting to run tactical military operations from the highest levels of the government has been shown, on numerous occasions, to be a less-than-optimal method. In my opinion, it is the function and duty of the executive branch to determine the goals and objectives of the country's foreign policy. When such policy involves the use of military force, the determination of how to best do that should be in the hands of the military, with appropriate executive and Congressional oversight. Lyndon Johnson proved that running a war from the White House only guarantees defeat. Henry Kissinger, in this case, underscored that fact with his meddling in affairs with which he was unfamiliar. The failure of the command and control of this operation is well documented in LTC John Guilmartin's book "A Very Small War." This the lesson which should be remembered from the Mayaguez incident.
I further salute LTC Wetterhahn's dedication to investigating this incident. It is obvious from his writing that he has spent considerable time and effort, not to mention personal funds, to pursue this investigation. I merely disagree with most of the main conclusions of the book.
By the way, what happened to the review by Charles Brown? As a crewmember on one of the participating aircraft, I should think that his opinion would be represented.
Bob Gradle
Copilot, Jolly 43
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