Average Reviews:
(More customer reviews)The authors provide interesting, behind-the-scenes accounts of the political and military players in this war, based on many interviews. What unfolds is far different from what was said publicly at the time.Occasionally, the New York Times reporter's and the retired Marine's apparent biases show through, detracting from an otherwise very good book. They seem to blame President Reagan's administration for not buying mine-clearing equipment for the Marines and the Navy, but then blame the Air Force--and not the administration--for using its money to buy items other than the latest survival radios for its aircrews. They also inaccurately claim that the Air Force developed a new doctrine for this war where they would be in charge of all theater airpower (a doctrinal concept developed by them during the North African campaign in World War II) and that the Strategic Air Command had controlled the B-52s deployed to Southeast Asia during the Viet Nam War (they actually were operationally controlled by the Theater), as well as a few other inaccurate items regarding the Air Force. It became rather apparent that all Services that were not Marines (and to a lesser extent, Navy) were denigrated. An example is their claim that the Air Force required that friendly aircraft obtain two means to verify an unknown aircraft's identification before firing on it in order to hold down the Navy's 'kill' rate (since the Navy had not invested in the systems to install two separate means of identification on each of their aircraft, they needed to contact the AWACS to obtain the second means). The Viet Nam War demonstrated this requirement and for whatever reason, the Navy had not addressed it in the interim--which the authors evidently refused to say. After summarizing what the politicians and military should do differently next time (after acknowledging that the media's outcry that the military had created killing zones north of Kuwait City partially caused the premature ending of the war), they also conveniently omitted a recommendation on what the media should do differently. Although the items cited above and a few similar ones throughout the book are distracting and cast some doubt on the entire book, their documented sources were sufficient (approximately one per page) to make them generally believable. I would recommend the book to anyone wanting to know what occurred behind the scenes, with a caution that it should be read critically and not be used as the reader's only source.
Click Here to see more reviews about: The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
0 comments:
Post a Comment